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Good afternoon.  I want to start by thanking you for inviting
me to join the distinguished parade of speakers who have pre-
ceded me at this podium.  I am unbelievably honored and pleased
to be here.  Lloyd Garrison whose eloquence and skillful lawyering
in cases like Scenic Hudson not only preserved important natural
resources like Storm King Mountain and the Hudson River, but
also helped launch the environmental movement we know today
and its legion of lawyers, many of whom sit in this audience or will
soon join their ranks.
Although the topic I want to address this afternoon, how to
induce each of us to be better environmental citizens, is largely
* Professor of Law, Georgetown Law; Professor Babcock served as general coun-
sel to the National Audubon Society from 1987-91 and as deputy general counsel and
Director of Audubon’s Public Lands and Water Program from 1981-97.  She has
taught Environmental Law as a visiting professor at Pace University Law School and
as an adjunct at the University of Pennsylvania, Yale, Catholic University, and Anti-
och law schools.
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outside the scope of our environmental laws, it nonetheless de-
serves our attention, especially as many of us will gather in a few
days to celebrate Earth Day.  The problem confronting us is that
we are nearing the end of achieving future gains in pollution
abatement from traditional sources and the pollution that re-
mains is largely caused by individual behavior.  This is true even
though polls show that people consistently rate protecting the en-
vironment among their highest priorities, say they are willing to
pay more to protect environmental resources, and indeed, faith-
fully contribute to environmental causes.  Most efforts to control
individual human sources of pollution have failed or not been tried
because of the monumental task and cost of regulating personal
behavior, the intrusiveness of doing so, and the inhibiting fear of
political backlash should regulation be attempted.
This lecture is my first step down a much longer road trying
to unravel this puzzle.1  At the end of the road, I hope to under-
stand why, given the strength of the abstract environmental pro-
tection norm, individuals behave in environmentally destructive
ways, and what, if anything, can be done to change that behavior.
The larger project will look at various ways of changing personal
behavior.2  But for this talk, I am going to focus on only one of
those ways: modifying social and personal norms.  I am also going
to look at only one circumstance in which norm change may occur,
during an environmental crisis accompanied by heightened public
activity, what some scholars, like Dan Farber and Michael
Vandenbergh, refer to as a “republican moment.”3  They believe
1. This lecture draws heavily on the work of Michael Vandenbergh on norms and
individual behavior, found in, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated
Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter From Smokestack to SUV]; The Social Meaning of Environmental Command and
Control, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191 (2001); Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of So-
cial Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55 (2003)
[hereinafter Beyond Elegance]; Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Ac-
tivation Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1101 (2005); The Carbon
Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673 (2007) [hereinafter The Carbon Neutral
Individual].
2. Since giving this lecture, the larger piece has been written and accepted for
publication. See Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving
the Environment: Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2008) [hereinafter Assuming Personal Responsibility].  A second es-
say will complete the trilogy. See Hope M. Babcock, Civic Republicanism Provides
Theoretical Support for Making Individuals More Environmentally Responsible, 23
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2009).
3. See Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 59, 66 (1992) (arguing the 1970 Earth Day had the appearance of a
“republican moment” in which twenty million people participated in various public
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/1
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such a moment occurred in response to the environmental disas-
ters of the late 1960s and early 1970s, which briefly resulted in
widespread public support for a variety of legislative and regula-
tory initiatives and spawned the emergence of what I call the envi-
ronmental citizen.
My thesis is that such a moment is happening again today,
and the generative crisis is global climate change.  The challenge
for this generation is how to capture and broaden the momentum
created by climate change to enlarge the abstract environmental
protection norm to specifically include individual responsibility
and thus perhaps change personal environmental behavior.
To develop this idea, I start with some of the empirical sup-
port for the contention that unregulated individual behavior is a
significant source of environmental pollution.  Since my thesis is
that the villains behind this behavior are the wrong norms, I
briefly discuss how norms are formed and their effect on personal
behavior as well as some barriers to their formation and to behav-
ioral changes.  I then turn my attention to this idea of a republi-
can moment and whether the growing sense of public crisis about
global climate change might be just such a moment.  While I be-
lieve it is, that is not the end of the story.  The moment must be
seized if a new norm of individual environmental responsibility is
to materialize and a reawakened environmental citizen who takes
greater responsibility for her personal behavior is to emerge.  I
conclude by discussing how that might be done.
Over a decade ago, former Environmental Protection Agency
Administrator William Ruckelshaus stated that “the most signifi-
cant threats to our environment now seem to lie, not with major
industrial sites, but in the habits of ordinary Americans: we like
to drive big powerful cars, use a lot of electricity, generate a lot of
waste, enjoy cheap food, live in grassy suburbs, and collectively
send pollution in massive amounts to often distant waterways and
airsheds.”4  Unfortunately that is still true.  We contribute to the
planet’s pollutant loadings every time we elect to drive instead of
walk, fertilize our lawns, spray pesticides on outdoor plants, pour
events, including 10,000 elementary and high schools, 200 colleges, and 2,000 commu-
nities); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental Command
and Control, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 212 (2001) (identifying the public’s response to
the environmental crises of the late-1960s and early-1970s as a “republican
moment”).
4. William D. Ruckelshaus, Stopping the Pendulum, ENVTL. F. 25, 26-27 (Nov./
Dec. 1995), quoted in Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental
Command and Control, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 197 n.32 (2001).
3
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household chemicals down the kitchen sink, and engage in a myr-
iad of other everyday activities.  Although each one of these be-
haviors contributes only a small amount of pollution to the
environment, when aggregated across the population, the total
amounts are staggering.  The result is that, although industrial
sources continue to be a major cause of pollution, individuals are
now the largest remaining source of many pollutants of concern.
For example, common household products and toiletries like
shaving cream, deodorants, soap, shampoo, toothpaste,
mouthwash, detergents, and soft drinks compose nearly fifteen
percent of the mercury found in domestic wastewater – an amount
equaling mercury discharges to wastewater from all large indus-
trial facilities combined.5 We also release mercury into the envi-
ronment each time we dispose of used batteries, florescent light
bulbs, thermometers, cell phones, and computers in the garbage or
along the side of a road.  Individuals discharge “fifty times more
benzene than all large industrial facilities combined and five
times more formaldehyde.”6  In 1997, EPA estimated home and
garden pesticide use accounted for eleven percent of total pesticide
use.  Ninety-five percent of urban carbon monoxide emissions
come from tailpipes and minor sources, while lawn and garden
equipment produce sixty-two percent of the carbon monoxide from
non-road sources.7  According to EPA, motor vehicles, consumer
products, and other small, non-industrial sources now contribute
seventy-six percent of all air toxics.
The individual polluter’s proportionate share of the total pol-
lutant load is getting larger as a result of population growth and
individual consumer choices, even as regulatory controls continue
to reduce emissions from large industrial sources.  For example,
the percentage of total emissions of nitrogen oxide and volatile or-
ganic compounds remains relatively stable because substantial re-
ductions in per-vehicle tailpipe emissions from mobile sources are
being offset by the increasing popularity of larger, more polluting
pick-up trucks and SUVs.  More cars on the road and urban
sprawl have resulted in vehicle miles traveled more than doubling
since 1970.
5. Unless otherwise noted, the statistics in this and the next two paragraphs
come from Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as
Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515 (2004).
6. Benzene is found in solvents and gasoline and formaldehyde in fungicides and
herbicides.
7. Michael P. Vandenberg & Anne C, Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral Individ-
ual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1677 (2007).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/1
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The risks arising from individual polluting behavior are often
equal to or greater than those arising from industrial sources be-
cause the releases occur near the user and other members of her
household.  Levels of pollutants in the air inside homes signifi-
cantly exceed levels in the ambient air, making indoor air pollu-
tion a leading human exposure pathway for many toxics.  Releases
of toxic chemicals by individuals also happen in places where they
are more likely to expose sensitive subpopulations because chil-
dren, the elderly, and sick “are more likely to breathe indoor air or
the air inside a motor vehicle than to breath air contaminated by
air toxics released from a distant factory.”8
Global consumption has achieved a historically high level
with as many goods and services being consumed since 1950 as all
previous generations combined.9  According to Gro Harlem Brund-
tland, former Prime Minister of Norway and former Chair of the
United Nation’s World Commission on the Environment and De-
velopment, “[i]t is simply impossible for the world as a whole to
sustain a Western level of consumption for all.  In fact, if seven
billion people were to consume as much energy and resources as
we do in the West today, we would need ten worlds, not one to
satisfy all our needs.”  Douglas Kysar sees the “competitive con-
sumer” as continually trading in perfectly good products for the
most recent model with the most up-to-the-minute features be-
cause she wants to own something relatively few others can ob-
tain, “an observable symbol that signifies success under prevailing
social norms.”  According to a Washington Post columnist, this
need to be conspicuous affects even the “green consumer” – “con-
suming” until you’re squeaky green.  It feels so good.  It looks so
good.  It feels so good to look so good, which is why conspicuous-
ness is key.”10
Most of the activities discussed above reflect personal lifestyle
choices beyond the scope of our environmental laws.  Even if there
were laws that reached these activities, enforcement would be a
serious problem.  Efforts to detect and ultimately enforce against
environmentally harmful individual activities, many of which oc-
cur in and around the home, would be costly for the government to
8. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm
Activation Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1101, 1153 (2005).
9. Unless otherwise indicated, the statistics and quotations in this paragraph
come from Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 675
(2003).
10. Monica Hesse, Greed in the Name of Green, to Worshipers of Consumption:
Spending Won’t Save the Earth, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2008, at CO1.
5
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carry out and would trigger enormous political resistance because
of the interference with individual liberty and invasion of privacy.
The questionable personal behavior may, in fact, be perfectly legal
(driving a Hummer) or generally tolerated (littering).  It is un-
likely that Congress will amend environmental laws to reach indi-
vidual actions because trying to legislate personal behavior would
generate enormous ill will and be politically suicidal.  This means
that changes in individual environmental behavior must come
about through other means.
The prospect of changing personal environmental behavior
through informal means is also daunting because of the many bar-
riers that lie in the way.  One barrier is the persistence of a “myth”
that incorrectly attributes the causes of environmental problems
solely to industrial point sources.  According to Vandenbergh, the
regulatory command and control system reflected in our major en-
vironmental laws has contributed to the persistence of this myth
by indirectly conveying “a second social meaning”11 – that indus-
trial polluters are the source of environmental problems, while in-
dividuals are part of the solution.  These laws target industrial
and manufacturing sources by imposing regulatory requirements
and penalties on them while individuals share enforcement re-
sponsibility for breaches of those laws under citizen suit
provisions.
Another reason for the persistence of this myth may be a form
of cognitive dissonance, the inability to hold two contradictory
views of oneself at the same time.  When we are subject to incon-
sistent thoughts or there are discrepancies between our thoughts
and actions, if we cannot resolve these contradictions easily, we
are inclined to wall away or side-step information that makes us
feel bad, particularly if feeling bad has to do with our own behav-
ior.  Cognitive dissonance makes it extremely difficult for us to be-
lieve that we support protection of the environment at the same
time that we are contributing to its degradation.  When good envi-
ronmental behavior requires some effort or costs money, it is eas-
ier to avoid any inquiry into the effects of our behavior and to
blame industry or even the government for the problem.
Lior Strahilevitz illustrates the phenomenon of cognitive dis-
sonance by pointing to the norm of solo commuting.  That norm is
so firmly engraved in the mind of the driving public that while
drivers recognize congestion is a problem, they view solo commut-
11. See, e.g., Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 191.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/1
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ing as an individual choice with individual consequences.12  The
solo commuting norm persists even though most of us recognize
that if everyone behaved as we do, traffic would be even more im-
possible than it is today.  We can observe that traffic is moving
better in HOV lanes and know that all we have to do to share in
that benefit would be to pick up additional drivers, but still we
drive alone.  In this regard, carpooling is similar to many environ-
mental goods where there is a “discrepancy between expressed cit-
izen preferences that support carpooling and actual commuter
behavior.”
We also are inclined to process information in ways that do
not necessarily increase our knowledge about a particular situa-
tion, especially one that may be harmful.  According to Daniel
Shuman, people consistently “overestimate their knowledge about
a decision; evaluate information and attribute causality in very
different ways based upon the framing of the information; [and]
. . . make stereotypical decisions and select information to support
them based on conclusions reached before receiving data about
those decisions.”13 Further, we all prefer choices that are
presented in “black-and-white over shades of gray,” which leads us
“to hold over-simplified beliefs and to hold them with excessive
confidence.” Given that environmental issues are frequently in
shades of gray, this cognitive problem could explain why it has
taken so long for Americans to absorb the complexity and “gray-
ness” of global warming.  The fact that people are also inclined “to
anchor their decisions stereotypically based upon their earlier
conclusions, and use information gained thereafter selectively to
support those decisions” makes it harder to persuade them to let
go of our earlier impressions about who is responsible for causing
environmental harms.
People suffer from an “alarmist bias,” on the one hand, and an
“optimistic bias,” on the other, both of which affect how we per-
ceive our own role as a contributor to environmental problems.14
The alarmist bias makes frightening information more salient.
Since there appears to be nothing alarming about engaging in
every day activities like house cleaning or gardening, it seems un-
12. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence
Social Norms: Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1236
(2000) (the thoughts and quotations in this paragraph are drawn from Strahilevitz’s
article).
13. Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L.
REV. 115, 129 (1993).
14. See From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 1.
7
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likely that those activities could actually be harmful.  At the same
time, an optimistic bias leads us to overestimate the earth’s capac-
ity to absorb environmental harm, which means we may underes-
timate the risk to the environment of using harmful substances in
our houses or on our lawns.  Additionally, the steep discount rate
that most people have leads them to under-value the benefits of
behavioral changes that will not occur until some time in the fu-
ture.  This may dissuade them from investing in energy efficient,
less polluting cars, lighting, and heating equipment.
There are many other reasons why people engage in poor en-
vironmental practices.  For example, personal habits, like leaving
lights on in an empty room, are hard to break.  According to
Vandenbergh, habits save mental effort and time by shortcutting
decisional processes.15  Because habits are so handy, they con-
tinue to control our behavior even when the costs of maintaining
them are high.  Habits become even harder to overcome if the new
behavior is inconvenient, costly, or requires significant effort to
engage in.
Because the amount of pollution from an individual is small
compared to the pollution from an industrial source, and its im-
pact is neither readily apparent nor necessarily immediate, it is
hard to convince any one individual that changing her behavior
will make a difference.  Pity the poor director of the Office of Envi-
ronmental Quality for Dallas who, after noting that one in four
vehicles in Texas is a gas guzzling pickup truck, said, “How do I
reach an individual citizen and tell them: Everybody makes a
difference.”16
Although there may be “generalized benefits to the collective,”
there are no visible immediate benefits to the person who behaves
in an environmentally responsible manner.17  Therefore, the ra-
tional individual can free-ride on the good behavior of others and
still get the benefit of their behavior.  Alternatively, the same ra-
tional individual can as easily reason that if she behaves consist-
ently with the collective good, her individual behavior will have no
effect unless others also participate.
None of us is very good at restraining ourselves, which is at
the heart of any request that we lower our rate of consumption.
15. See, e.g., From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 1 (discussing the topic of
habits).
16. Felicity Barringer, In Many Communities, It’s Not Easy Going Green, N. Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008, at A14.
17. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231 (2001).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/1
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While we may be able to exercise self-restraint on small matters
(giving up chocolate for Lent), to achieve something as large and
challenging as global warming, zero discharge of pollution, or bi-
odiversity protection “takes a village,” a committed community of
supporters.  America’s love affair with cars and the power of the
“norm of solo commuting” illustrate how hard it is to change per-
sonal behavior based on a theory of self-restraint.
The fact that we misapprehend our role as a causative factor
in environmental degradation leads us to resist changing our be-
havior, especially when behavior change is costly or inconvenient
and an immediate personal benefit from improved behavior may
not be readily apparent.  People are also unwilling to change their
behavior, if they do not believe the reason behind the suggested
behavioral change or they question the legitimacy of the underly-
ing norm or the institution recommending the change.  Addition-
ally, if the new good behavior, like recycling or driving to a
hazardous waste disposal site to dispose of your toxic household
cleansers, is not observed by others, then one of the most impor-
tant reasons why people behave well, the positive regard of neigh-
bors and friends, is missing.
Last, it may be difficult to figure out what the correct behav-
ior is.18  Often, there are no simple answers to environmental
problems.  Sometimes the answers spawn new problems.  For ex-
ample, two recent scientific studies independently concluded that
biofuels cause more greenhouse gas emissions than conventional
fuels when the full emissions costs of producing them are ac-
counted for.19  So what should the good environmental citizen who
is concerned about climate change do?  When uncertainty is cou-
pled with the inertia created by myths, cognitive dissonance,
habit, and other barriers to changing personal environmental be-
havior, it is not difficult to see why people do not easily abandon
their prior “bad” behavior.
How can norms, mere social or personal rules that do not de-
pend on the government for their issuance or enforcement, help
18. See, e.g., Barringer, supra note 16, at A14; Michael Specter, Big Foot: In Mea-
suring Carbon Emissions, it’s Easy to Confuse Morality With Science, THE NEW
YORKER, Feb. 25, 2008, at 44, 48.
19. Elizabeth Rosenthal, Studies Call Biofuels a Greenhouse Threat, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 2008, at A9 (Prominent among those costs is land clearing for the production of
fuel crops as well as the emissions released during the process of converting plants
into fuel from refining and transportation).
9
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surmount the barriers to “good” environmental behavior?20  After
all, norms are only informal obligations that tell us how we should
behave to conform to some community standard of proper
behavior.
We have internalized some norms as obligations or as a result
of repeated, personal contacts with family, friends, neighbors,
schools or religious organizations.  Giving money to charities, tip-
ping at restaurants where you have no expectation of returning,
and scooping your dog’s poop are all examples of internal norms
that most of us have.  These personal interactions become a mu-
tual expectation of how we are going to act that constrains our
behavior, even when we know that others will not reward our good
behavior.  Internal norms are generally enforced through a sense
of guilt, anxiety, or loss of self esteem.
There are also external norms.  They are different from inter-
nal norms because they embody general expectations about appro-
priate public behavior and are, therefore, responsive to external
forms of enforcement like gossip, labeling, shaming or shunning.
When our behavior comports with an internal norm, we feel proud
and experience a sense of increased self esteem. When we comply
with an external norm our standing in our community, among our
friends and family is enhanced; we earn their esteem and praise.
According to Ann Carlson, violating an internal or external norm
creates a cost that can “tip” the cost-benefit balance of an action in
favor of conforming to the norm.21
Norms are thus a private, decentralized, and inexpensive way
of controlling social behavior through personal guilt, community
observation, and sanctions like shaming.  Norms can also supple-
ment government action.  They work particularly well for small,
insignificant violations or in cases where it is too hard to prove
guilt – like pouring waste oil down a drain or throwing a bottle out
20. In developing this part of the paper on norms, what they are, how they emerge
and change, and how they are enforced, in addition to Michael Vandenbergh’s article
noted earlier, I have drawn on the work of Richard A. Posner, Creating and Enforcing
Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 369 (1999); Saul
Levmore, Norms and Supplements, 86 VA. L. REV. 1989 (2000); Robert D. Cooter,
Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and Internalization, 79
OR. L. REV. 1 (2000); Alex Geisinger, A Group Identity Theory of Social Norms and Its
Implications, 78 TUL. L. REV. 605 (2004); Geoffrey P. Miller, Norms and Interests, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 637 (2003); Geoffrey P. Miller, Norm Enforcement in the Public
Sphere: The Case of Handicapped Parking, 71 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 895 (2003); Ann E.
Carlson, supra note 17; Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
21. Carlson, supra note 17, at 1294.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/1
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a car window.  Norms work because they and the expected sanc-
tions for their violation, like a look of disapproval, are generally
understood.
This is not to say that norms always function well as ways of
controlling social behavior – they do not, especially in circum-
stances where the harms caused by the norm violator are exter-
nalized to others.  In that situation, the effort and cost of
conforming to the norm will probably exceed the benefit from be-
having properly, making it unlikely that behavior will change.
Additionally, if there are external constraints on your choice of be-
havior, such as the cost of alternative behavior or the effort in-
volved in implementing the new behavior, you may deploy some of
the cognitive devices I mentioned before to neutralize guilt, such
as blaming others for the problem or redefining the problem so
that the particular norm is not invoked.  Any ambiguity about the
specific behavior required to conform to the norm will reduce any
feeling of personal guilt for not complying and will also leave ex-
ternal norm enforcers uncertain about whether they should
shame or ostracize the bad actor.  Further, to the extent norms are
created and sustained by social sanctions, it may be difficult to
find ways to use those sanctions in situations where the norm vio-
lator acts in private or in non-repeat circumstances, for example
solo commuting in an HOV lane.
Nonetheless, abstract norms, like environmental protection,
do influence our behavior when we are aware of the consequences
our actions will have for others, and when we accept personal re-
sponsibility for those actions.  According to Vandenbergh, when
those two factors are present, a concrete norm that relates to, or
implements, an abstract norm and tells us how to act will be acti-
vated.22  Our compliance with a norm also increases if we are con-
fident about the information telling us our behavior is bad and in
situations where we believe the norm will be enforced by others,
like our family, community, or even the government.
Thus, providing information that ties our behavior (turning
off lights) to avoiding environmental harm (air pollution from
coal-fired power plants) appears to be an essential part of activat-
ing positive, concrete environmental norms (conserve energy).  In
situations where the relevant community agrees on how to con-
form to a concrete norm, a level of expectation about proper behav-
ior is created to which we almost unthinkingly conform, like
22. Beyond Elegance, supra note 1, at 73.
11
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saying thank you when someone does something for you.  We have
no doubt whether a particular behavior is good or bad in those
circumstances; we have internalized that lesson, and motivators
of personal behavior like guilt, lack of self esteem, or community
sanction come into play to enforce the concrete norm.
Thirty years of polling data show that there continues to be a
widely supported, powerful abstract norm promoting protection of
human health and the environment.  There are also other broadly
held abstract norms that indirectly influence good environmental
behavior.23  One of these is the “compliance with law norm.”  Most
of us have internalized this norm and feel a moral commitment to
be law-abiding, which functions as a constraint on our behavior
and which is reinforced by a sense of shame if the prohibited act
occurs.  Thus, we do not generally fill wetlands, kill endangered
species, or engage in other obvious violations of the law even when
we think we may not be caught.  A second broadly held abstract
norm is the “personal responsibility norm,” summarized in the eu-
phemism “Do no harm to others.”  Vandenbergh believes this
norm can be linked to global warming and lead to reduced individ-
ual carbon-emitting behavior.24
Unfortunately, there are also competing abstract norms of
equal or greater strength that may inhibit good environmental be-
havior.  For example, the more we adhere to what Vandenbergh
calls the “autonomy norm,” rather than behaving in an environ-
mentally correct way when faced with possible sanctions, the more
we may instead increase our non-compliant behavior.  Texas has
used the autonomy or individual liberty norm to good effect in its
“Don’t Mess with Texas – Real Texans Don’t Litter” anti-littering
campaign.  The state emphasizes the aspect of litter prevention
that involves individual control over the quality of the environ-
ment rather than government control over the individual.  Simi-
larly, the “privacy norm” might prevent the internalization of a
new norm because it might interfere with the use of shame sanc-
tions, which can encourage norm internalization.
The “reciprocity norm” is activated when we believe we are
not being treated fairly, that our good behavior is not being re-
warded or that the bad behavior of others in not being sanctioned
in some way, lessening the impetus to adhere to a norm of good
environmental behavior.  The “conformity norm” arises when we
23. The non-environmental norms that are discussed in this part of the article
come from Beyond Elegance, supra note 1.
24. The Carbon Neutral Individual, supra note 1, at 1678.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/1
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use the behavior of others to evaluate our own behavior.  That
norm stokes our fear of being perceived as a patsy or a dupe if we
engage in good environmental behavior, like properly disposing of
litter or conserving water, after observing widespread noncompli-
ance with that behavior.
Additionally, while the abstract environmental protection
norm is robust, it may be too abstract and not sufficiently fine-
tuned or related to specific concrete norms (clean beaches) and de-
sired actions (do not litter) to overcome all the barriers and con-
flicting norms that lie in the way of environmentally responsible
personal behavior.  Persuading people to adhere to an abstract en-
vironmental protection norm is much more difficult than persuad-
ing parents to put their child in a car seat where the benefit to the
child is obvious, and there is an immediate connection with the
norm of being a good parent and the related action.25
Perhaps a partial solution lies in modifying the abstract envi-
ronmental protection norm to address individual environmental
responsibility.  Doing this will tie the supplemental concrete
norms more directly to personal behavior and thus increase the
likelihood of their implementation by individuals.
However, changing a norm is a difficult and lengthy process
involving public acceptance and enforcement of the modified
norm.  To the extent the abstract environmental protection norm
has been implemented in a way that makes companies and manu-
facturers the principal parties responsible for environmental
harm, the challenge is even greater because changing that norm
requires the abandonment of preconceived ideas.  Steps must also
be taken during any change in the current industry-focused envi-
ronmental protection norm that it not disappear as people substi-
tute themselves for the traditional sources of environmental
harm.
One way of creating or modifying norms and influencing per-
ceptions about the acceptability of certain behavior is the enact-
ment of a law, such as requiring the use of seat belts, or issuance
of a regulation mandating certain behavior.  According to Robert
Cooter, it may be enough for a new law or regulation merely to be
proposed to create an expectation that new environmental behav-
ior is required, causing “a jump to a new [behavioral] equilib-
rium,”26 not unlike how complex ecosystems behave in response to
25. See Beyond Elegance, supra note 1, at 75.
26. Cooter, supra note 20, at 21.
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some change or disturbance.  However, as noted earlier, it is
highly unlikely that a new law or rule regulating individual envi-
ronmental behavior will be proposed, let alone enacted.
Cooter suggests that the government can also assist in the
emergence of a new norm through public programs that express
norms, like sponsoring beach cleanups or posting “no smoking
signs” in public places.  These initiatives can be seen as reflecting
a public consensus about an undesirable action and can tie an ab-
stract norm (environmental protection) to a concrete norm (clean
beaches) and a specific, desirable action (don’t litter), which in
turn can lead to reformed behavior.  Strahilevitz says the govern-
ment can additionally help influence norms by recasting an activ-
ity that was formerly viewed as an individual choice (smoking)
with individual consequences (the smoker’s health) into one that
causes harm to others (second hand smoke), activating
Vandenbergh’s “personal responsibility norm.”  However, other
scholars, like Alex Geisinger, believe government interference in
norm creation and enforcement is counter-productive and, at best,
limited because the government is not an “ingroup source.”27
If not the government, then who should play the role of norm
modifier?  Cass Sunstein suggests that “norm entrepreneurs” –
“self-appointed champions of particular values or rules of behav-
ior”28– can function as a force for change.  When a norm entrepre-
neur starts to change the behavior of others a “ ‘cascade’ or
‘bandwagon’ effect may occur as people abandon the old norm and
come to behave in conformity with the new one.”29  According to
Geisenger, this type of cascade can be set off by a sustained infor-
mation campaign from a trusted source.
However, there must be a sense of urgency about the underly-
ing problem, if a modified abstract norm of environmental protec-
tion is to emerge and affect behavior.  I submit that global
warming, like the burning rivers and polluted air of the 1960s and
1970s, has created the requisite sense of urgency.30  But urgency
without action is not enough for a norm to emerge.  What is
needed is an “outburst of democratic participation and ideological
27. Geisinger, supra note 20, at 651.
28. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909
(1996).
29. Miller, supra note 20, at 639.
30. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Third Assessment Report
(2001), and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Fourth Assessment Report
(2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch.
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/1
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politics” potentially transforming “our political order,”31 like what
occurs during a “republican moment.”
Such an “outburst” seems to be happening as well.  For exam-
ple “possessing an excessive carbon footprint is rapidly becoming
the modern equivalent of wearing a scarlet letter.”32  During Lent,
the Church of England suggested that parishioners give up carbon
rather than chocolate as part of a carbon fast.  Wind turbines fu-
elled the 2008 Super Bowl.  Wal-Mart and Yahoo! have launched
an initiative called “18 seconds” to encourage people to switch
from incandescent light bulbs to more energy efficient compact
fluorescent bulbs.  Sara Lee is using solar panels at one of its bak-
eries.  Major investment banks, like Citigroup, have issued “car-
bon principles,” under which they will give greater scrutiny to
proposals to build new coal-fired plants.33  Former Vice President
Al Gore won an Oscar for “An Inconvenient Truth” and shared a
Nobel Peace Prize for work on global climate change.  There are
over 125 bills pending in Congress responding to the global cli-
mate change crisis,34 and an equally impressive array of compara-
ble state and local initiatives.35  Airlines, businesses, the entire
European Community, the 2008 Olympics, even the U.S. House of
Representatives are striving to become carbon neutral, heralding
31. Farber, supra note 3, at 66 (quoting James Pope, Republican Moments: The
Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 UNIV. PENN.
L. REV. 287, 291-3 (1990)).
32. Specter, supra note 18, at 44.  Specter’s article is the source of many of the
examples in the text.
33. Steven Mufson, A Victory Near for Utilities in Kansas Coal Battle, WASH POST,
Feb. 23, 2008, at D2 (noting that Bank of America will “factor in a cost for carbon
dioxide emissions when it considers financing for new coal plants. . .”).
34. Trang Do, Duke Researcher Helps Congress Shape Global Warming Policy,
MEDILL REPORTS, July 25, 2007 http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/washington/
news.aspx?id=41323 (last visited Feb. 26, 2008).
35. For example, seventeen states have adopted “overarching greenhouse emis-
sion reduction targets”; 800 mayors representing more than seventy-seven million
people in all fifty states have signed the U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protec-
tion Agreement, committing them to reduce community-wide greenhouse gas emis-
sions by 2012 to 7% below 1990 levels regional agreements; and, several states have
entered into various regional agreements, some of which set regional greenhouse gas
reduction targets, others of which establish regional cap-and-trade programs, still
others together with local governments have established programs to improve power
supply energy efficiency and the energy efficiency of consumer products for which
there are no federal standards, and others have launched initiatives to reduce green-
house gas emissions through encouraging mass transportation, constructing bike
lanes and pedestrian pathways, compact development proposals, and adoption of
smart growth initiatives. See, e.g., Committee on Energy and Commerce Staff White
Paper, Climate Change Legislative Design: Appropriate Roles for Different Levels of
Government 3-7 (Feb. 2008).
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the possible emergence of a new concrete norm calling for carbon
neutrality.
Global warming thus appears to have catapulted Americans
out of a period of apathy about environmental issues into one in
which interest in them is extraordinarily high.  Newly identified
problems like hurricanes, shrinking glaciers, rising temperatures,
and threatened polar bears have activated the public almost into a
frenzy of concern.  However, unless the emerging carbon neutral-
ity norm addresses individual action, Vandenbergh’s hoped-for
“carbon-neutral individual”36 may not appear, let alone the envi-
ronmentally responsible citizen I want to see materialize.
During a republican moment the public is more open to al-
lowing itself to be educated in ways that will make them better
citizens, in this case, how to be better stewards of this planet.37
But, there are well-known problems trying to educate people
about environmental harms, some of which are reflected in the
examples of cognitive dissonance I discussed earlier.  There is also
the problem of information overload where “[t]oo much informa-
tion may overwhelm consumers, or simply cause them to disre-
gard it entirely.”38  Further, the complexity of environmental
information can create a tendency to simplify the message to
make it accessible to the average person, opening the messenger
up to criticism for not acknowledging the issue’s complexities, or
to use alarmist language to catch the public’s attention, which
quickly wears out and can backfire when the event does not occur.
On the other hand, purely “descriptive information” has little
chance for success unless the behavior the individual is engaging
in is neither in her interest nor driven by deep-rooted habits or, as
Lawrence Lessig suggests, the recommended behavioral change is
tied to an already popular concept, such as protecting the Chesa-
peake Bay.39
36. As an example of what such an person might look like, see Dan Nainan, A
Comedian Goes Green but Won’t Go Off Color, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2008, at C7
(describing the steps he has taken to reduce his carbon footprint, such as preventing
hotel housekeeping from laundering his sheets and towels each day of his stay, un-
plugging his room phone, air-conditioner, alarm clock and television, not driving and
living in a small apartment, and saying “[m]y efforts won’t change the world, but
maybe it will help my corner of it”).
37. See, e.g., Susan Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizen-
ship, U. CHI. L. REV. 131 (1995).
38. Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP.
U. L. REV. 21, 140 (2001).
39. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943,
1009 (1995).
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The conundrum is that other methods for changing individual
behavior by themselves, like command and control regulation, eco-
nomic incentives, or shaming, are either less publicly acceptable
or have an even lower likelihood of working than public educa-
tion.40  Therefore, given the current environmental circumstances
in which we find ourselves, even with its flaws, public education
should be an essential part of any strategy to change norms and
personal behavior.
I propose that environmental groups, not the government,
should be the educators – Sunstein’s norm entrepreneurs.  These
groups are already actively involved in educating the public about
global warming and have had some success.  They are experts not
only in the substance of environmental problems, but also in using
the media for information dispersal and in local organizing and
coalition building.41  They know how to simplify complex informa-
tion and how to use environmental crises to incite behavioral
change and instill a sense of individual guilt for not taking action
to expiate the problem — a tactic they employ to great success to
increase membership and donations.  The autonomy norm means
that information from environmentalists may be more trusted and
better received than from the government.
In short, environmental groups can help people understand
how their actions can substantially affect the environment, use
that understanding to begin the process of expanding the abstract
environmental protection norm to include individual actions, iden-
tify preferred environmental behavior, and then link that behav-
ior to specific concrete norms.
Yet, it is unlikely that even skilled environmentalists armed
with intelligible, trustworthy information will be able to overcome
the many barriers to norm change without additional sanctions or
incentives, or that changing norms, without more, will be enough
to change behavior.  Identifying what those additional measures is
the goal of the larger project.42  Nonetheless, the measures pro-
posed in this talk offer a starting point for changing personal be-
havior, and efforts to implement them should start soon.
40. See, e.g., Assuming Personal Responsibility, supra note 2.
41. Many of the statements about how environmental groups function and their
skill set are based on the personal knowledge of the author as former General Counsel
of the National Audubon Society and Director of its Public Lands and Waters Pro-
gram, and from Farber, supra note 3, at 71.
42. As noted earlier, the larger project in the form of a law review article is now
completed. See Assuming Personal Responsibility, supra note 2.
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Time is of the essence – when isn’t it when the environment is
at stake?  Environmental groups should capitalize now on growing
public concern about global warming.  When teaching about cli-
mate change, they should include how individuals contribute to
the problem and suggest ways to adopt less environmentally
harmful behavior.  If people can understand that they are a source
of greenhouse gases, realize that there are relatively easy, availa-
ble, and cost efficient alternative behaviors that will lessen their
contribution to the problem, and experience the direct and indirect
benefits of becoming Vandenbergh’s carbon neutral individual,
then this might create the landscape for modifying the abstract
environmental norm to include individual behavior.  New behav-
ioral habits may then emerge that could significantly reduce the
amount of pollution in the environment.
But, experience teaches that republican moments are short-
lived.  Once they are gone, the public may well slide back into a
period of apathy about the environment until the next environ-
mental republican moment, and by then it may be too late.
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/1
